Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors:  Can Outrageous Conduct Be  Free Exercise ? by Brooks, Lee W.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 6 
1986 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual 
Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free Exercise"? 
Lee W. Brooks 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, Religion Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lee W. Brooks, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous 
Conduct Be "Free Exercise"?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1296 (1986). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol84/iss6/3 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTES 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual 
Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free Exercise"? 
You are the judge. A complaint has been filed in your court alleg-
ing "clergy malpractice"1 and the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress2 by a minister in the course of spiritual counseling. 3 The facts 
1. Clergy malpractice was apparently first alleged in Nally v. Grace Community Church of 
the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 304 (1984) (deleted from official reporter by California Supreme 
Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984)). Plaintiffs alleged that defendant church's counselors 
were "negligent in failing to adhere to and to exercise the standard of care for a clergyman of 
[their] sect and training in the community." Plaintiff's Complaint at 4, Nally. 
The innovative cause of action involved in the Nally case occasioned much commentary. See 
H. MALONY, T. NEEDHAM & s. SOUTHARD, CLERGY MALPRACTICE (1986); Augspurger, Legal 
Concerns of the Pastoral Counselor. 29 PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY 109 (1980); Bergman, ls the 
Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Ma/practice, 9 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 47 (1981); 
Bernstein, A Potential Peril of Pastoral Care: Malpractice, 19 J. RELIGION & HEALTH 48 (1980); 
Breecher, Ministerial Malpractice: ls It a Reasonable Fear?, 16 TRIAL, July 1980, at 11; Erics· 
son, Clergyman Ma/practice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1981); 
Marty, Ministerial Ma/practice, 96 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 511 (1979); McMenamin, Clergy 
Malpractice, 90 CASE & COM. Sept.-Oct. 1985 at 3; Note, Seeing in a Mirror Dimly? Clergy 
Malpractice as a Cause of Action: Nally v. Grace Community Church, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 349 
(1986); Case Note, Religious Counseling - Parents Allowed to Pursue Suit Against Church and 
Clergy far Son's Suicide, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213; Comment, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A 
Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Ma/practice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 507 (1983). 
Despite all these reviews, the cause of action has not played well in the courts. Clergy mal-
practice has been alleged in some recent cases. See Carey, Churches Are Taken to Court More 
Often In Internal Disputes, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 1; McMenanin, supra, at 4, 6; 
Comment, supra, at 508 nn.7-10. However, no reported opinion has yet recognized a cause of 
action for clergy malpractice. But see Lund v. Caple, 100 Wash. 2d 739, 675 P.2d 226, 231 
(1984) (en bane) (rejecting a cause of action involving defendant clergyman's sexual "miscon· 
duct" with plaintiff's wife as too similar to the abolished action for alienation of affections, but 
suggesting that "a malpractice action would be appropriate where a counselor fails to conform to 
an appropriate standard of care, injures the patient/spouse which in tum results in loss of con· 
sortium damages to the other spouse"). 
This Note is not directly concerned with negligence actions against members of the clergy or 
with the viability of "clergy malpractice" as a distinct cause of action. But see note 8 infra, 
2. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress lies when the actor "by extreme and 
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another." RE· 
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46(1) (1977). 
In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (deleted from 
official reporter by California Supreme Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984)) the court chose 
not to reach plaintiff's clergy malpractice claim, and instead upheld a cause of action against a 
church and members of the church's staff of pastoral counselors for intentional infliction of emo· 
tional distress. Plaintiffs alleged that their son, who was known to be suicidal for some months 
before his death, had been counseled by several pastors of defendant church that suicide by a 
believer is "acceptable and even a desirable alternative." 204 Cal. Rptr. at 306. The court found 
there to be sufficient evidence tending to show that the church and its counselors caused the son 
to become depressed, to believe suicide to be a theologically acceptable response, and ultimately 
to commit suicide. 
The Nally court held that "the free exercise clause of the First Amendment does not license 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in the name of religion and cannot shield defendants 
from liability for wrongful death for a suicide caused by such conduct." 204 Cal. Rptr. at 308· 
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are set forth in the complaint and several affidavits as follows: 
· Pastor Al Kehr is a minister at the Small City Mainstream4 Truth-
ful Church. Frank Zeal, a college student from a neighboring state, 
attended a Mainstream Truthful Church as a child in his hometown. 
Six months ago, Frank began attending Pastor Kehr's Mainstream 
Church on a fairly regular basis. 5 About four months ago, he ap-
proached Pastor Kehr after a Wednesday night Bible class and asked 
if they could talk privately. The two then met in the Pastor's study 
about once a week for a couple of months. During these sessions 
Frank complained of anxiety and depression and described various 
personal problems. 
Pastor Kehr felt strongly that he could pull Frank out of his slump 
by helping him reestablish a firm relationship with God and the 
Church, but not all of his counseling was specifically religious.6 At the 
09. The opinion, which was followed by a strong dissent, was subsequently decertified by the 
California Supreme Court, and thus may not be cited as precedent. Ranii, Clergy Malpractice -
The Prayer for Relief. Natl. L.J., Mar. 4, 1985, at I, 31, col. 4. 
Although the case was remanded for a second trial, it was dismissed at the close of plaintiff's 
case. The trial judge ruled: "There is no compelling state interest for this court to interfere in the 
pastoral counseling activities of Grace Community Church. Such interference could result in 
excessive entanglement of the state in the church and religious beliefs and teachings." Judge 
Dismisses Clergy Malpractice Suit on Coast, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1985, at 11, col. 1 (city ed.) 
(quoting Judge J. Kalin). 
3. This Note adopts the expression "spiritual counseling" as a generic term for what is often 
referred to in the Jewish and Christian traditions as "pastoral care," that is, counseling con-
ducted by a personal counselor who is vested with religious authority (a "spiritual counselor") 
and whose counsel is actually or potentially derived from religious precepts. 
4. A well-established, mainstream religious group may be somewhat favored in our courts 
over a novel and unconventional group. Some recent Supreme Court cases suggest that the more 
one can point to history and tradition in support of one's practices, the more likely those prac-
tices are to be found constitutional. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelley, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (legitimate 
secular purposes for creche in city Christmas display); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) 
(unique history of prayer during legislative sessions). 
While new, nonconformist groups do pose some practical difficulties for the courts, see Part I 
infra (on distinguishing the religious from the secular) and note 101 infra (discussing abusive and 
deceptive religious practices), "cults" are in theory no less entitled to constitutional protection 
than other religious groups. 
Sociologically, a cult is the starting point of every religion. Its organization is extremely 
simple .... [There are no] scriptures .... The cult is ... nonconformist for two reasons. 
First, it struggles to start a radically new religious tradition, and, second, it exists in tension 
and conflict with what it regards as a corrupt, troubled world. 
D. BROMLEY & A. SHUPE, JR., STRANGE Goos: THE GREAT AMERICAN CULT SCARE 23 
(1981). 
5. A plaintiff who can be considered a member of a religious group and presumed cognizant 
of its beliefs and practices is placed at a significant disadvantage in a lawsuit against that group. 
See Part 11.B.2 infra. 
6. To respond meaningfully to the enormous range of counselee problems, spiritual counsel-
ing must be much more spontaneous and improvisational than most religious practices. Effective 
counseling may go on in harmony with fundamental religious doctrines without necessarily being 
carried out strictly in religious terms or in accordance with rigid or predetermined religious 
procedures. Thus, a threshold question (discussed more fully in Part I infra) is whether spiritual 
counseling ought to be characterized, for legal purposes, as religious or secular. See Brief of 
Defendant-Respondents at 12, Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 
303 (1984) (deleted from official reporter by California Supreme Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 940 
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seminary, he had taken a course in pastoral counseling,7 in which he 
had learned the fundamentals of practical psychology. He made use of 
his psychological knowledge by pursuing several lines of questioning 
through which he established to his satisfaction that Frank was not 
suicidal, presented no danger to others, and harbored no deep-seated 
psychological ailments. 8 Once this was accomplished, the principal 
(1984)) ("Pastoral counseling ... is so inextricably entwined with religious, spiritual and doctri-
nal matters that the judicial system is proscribed by the First Amendment from addressing it, 
unless fraud is alleged."); see also Ericsson, supra note 1, at 166-67; Marty, supra note 1, at 511; 
Comment, supra note l, at 514-17. But see Bergman, supra note 1, at 57-59 (Spiritual counseling, 
though incidentally carried out by individuals who also perform purely sacred functions, is essen-
tially secular, and merely ancillary to the counselor's religious role.). 
Both extreme views are untenable. The asserted equivalence of spiritual and secular counsel-
ors is at odds with the public policy embodied in state statutes specifically exempting spiritual 
counselors from the licensing requirements applicable to other counselors. E.g., CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE§ 4980.01 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 333.18214(5) (1979); N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 31.02(a)(3)(iii) (McKinney 1978). On the other hand, the significant 
religious aspect of spiritual counseling will not always predominate. See note 7 infra. The incon-
clusiveness of the debate on this point suggests that the sweeping claims on either side are mis-
conceived, and that spiritual counseling is best characterized as a hybrid process, combining 
religious belief and practice with secular learning and techniques. 
7. Such courses are common, and often rely heavily upon secular psychology and psychiatry 
for a vocabulary and an overview of human development and behavior. See, e.g., THE CATHOLIC 
UNIV. OF AMERICA, ANNOUNCEMENTS: SCHOOL OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES: 1985-86, at 134 
("Psychological and spiritual models of adult growth and development" used in course "Spiritual 
Direction and Pastoral Counseling: A Holistic Development Model" in the graduate Depart-
ment of Theology); GRAND RAPIDS BAPTIST COLLEGE, 1984-86 CATALOG 86 ("Theories of 
Counseling" and "Techniques of Counseling" included in advanced psychology courses); JEW-
ISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF AMERICA, ACADEMIC BULLETIN: 1985-86, at 96-97 ("Princi-
ples of Counseling," with a prerequisite of two psychology courses, is a required course for 
ordination candidates in the Rabbinical School's Department of Pastoral Psychiatry.); UNION 
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, CATALOG: 1984-85, at 125-29 (advanced courses such as "Anxiety," 
"Identity," "Aggression," "The dream and Christian faith," and "Fantasy and religious experi-
ence" included in program on "Psychiatry and Religion"). 
For those who may have missed such courses, an extensive literature exploring the relevance 
of psychological insights, techniques, and terminology to spiritual counseling is available. See, 
e.g., E. DRAPER, PSYCHIATRY AND PASTORAL CARE (1965); E. DUCKER, PSYCHOTHERAPY: A 
CHRlsrIAN APPROACH (1964); PSYCHIATRY AND RELIGION (J. Liebman ed. 1948); A. RUNE-
STAM, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CHRisrIANITY (1958); H. SIMPSON, PASTORAL CARE OP NER· 
VOUS PEOPLE (1946). 
8. If the clergy malpractice concept has a future, it lies most likely in allegations of failure to 
carry out this sort of inquiry into the nature and gravity of a counselee's concerns and in a 
consequent failure to refer cases beyond the spiritual counselor's professional competence to 
those better educated to handle them. A quite different understanding of clergy malpractice, 
which assumes that spiritual counselors might be held liable for the neglect of a religious duty, 
has been deservedly satirized: " 'Seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these 
things shall be yours as well.' What if, for once, someone would heed such advice and, in the eyes 
of court, 'all these things' were not added? Sue 'em." Marty, supra note 1, at 511. 
At least one commentator has suggested that clergy malpractice should be modeled more 
closely upon psychiatric than upon medical malpractice. See generally Bernstein, supra note 1. 
Limiting the application of clergy malpractice to "negligent failure to refer'' would align clergy 
malpractice more closely with psychiatric malpractice as presently understood. See Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (en bane) 
(recognizing cause of action for psychiatric malpractice founded not upon a failure to treat the 
patient properly but upon a failure to warn those in the community who were endangered by the 
patient's release). But see Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 762 (Mo. 1969) (citing Landau v. 
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focus of their conversations was the relevance of various Mainstream 
religious principles to Frank's problems. 
On the evening of what turned out to be their last session together, 
Pastor Kehr, by his account, had been reading from the Bible and 
certain other well-accepted teachings of his faith. Frank had confessed 
to certain sins (which the Pastor now declines to detail),9 after which, 
at the Pastor's continued urging, Frank repented and renewed his 
commitment to God. Although Frank was upset when he left, the Pas-
tor was sure that Frank's soul was on the mend. 
Frank views this final session quite differently. He was, he says, 
visibly upset when he arrived that night. Over the course of the eve-
ning he revealed certain highly personal matters to the Pastor and was 
alarmed to find these matters become the subject of an impassioned 
assault upon his self-esteem and sensibilities. According to Frank's 
complaint, the Pastor-whom he had just begun to view as a trusted 
friend - shouted, raved, and berated him in an outrageous and mali-
cious10 manner. Reduced to tears, Frank had blubbered for a while 
about he knew not what, finally rushing off into the night in what his 
expert witness intends to denominate a "disassociative state."11 
Werner, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961) (British case holding psychoanalyst liable for mishandling the 
transference phenomenon)). 
Limiting clergy malpractice to cases of "negligent failure to refer" would also tend to clarify 
the relationship between spiritual and secular counseling and would provide a remedy when 
spiritual counselors neglect or aggravate their counselees' preexisting mental or emotional ill-
nesses. Thus, the cause of action might properly be recognized on facts such as those alleged in 
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (deleted from official 
reporter by California Supreme Court, see 151 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984)) (suicidal man alleged to 
have been discouraged from keeping appointments with psychiatrist) or in Meroni v. Holy Spirit 
Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity, 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 
1984) (emotionally disturbed man alleged to have been "brainwashed," hypnotically controlled, 
and physically constrained), but the cause of action would not apply to cases such as Lund v. 
Caple, 100 Wash. 2d 739, 675 P.2d 226 (1984) (en bane) (husband alleging that spiritual coun-
selor had sexual relationship with plaintiff's wife). 
9. The evidentiary privilege protecting confidential communications between spiritual coun-
selor and counselee, see McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2 n.5 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) ("All but 
three states ... appear to recognize the privilege."), is unlikely to have much bearing on cases of 
this kind. The privilege protects only confidential communications, not counseling conduct, and 
has no effect once it is waived by the counselee. At most, this privilege is a minor impediment to 
factual inquiry. 
10. The legal repercussions of a spiritual counselor's malicious conduct are explored at notes 
102-03 infra and accompanying text. 
11. These two accounts conflict on whether Pastor Kehr's conduct was religious and whether 
it was malicious, but not upon whether he acted intentionally to cause Frank's distress. To the 
Pastor, Frank's heightened emotion was a positive and necessary step toward spiritual renewal. 
A first amendment defense under these circumstances is an assertion of the right to inflict distress 
in the name of religion. Cf. J. HOFFMAN, ETHICAL CONFRONTATION IN COUNSELING 88 (1979) 
(Spiritual counseling's "ethical dimension cannot rest simply with the disinterested clarification 
of the client's values ... but must eventuate, on occasion, in a direct and honest confrontation 
with the moral values of the counselor, even with the possibility of a moral rebuke."). Whether 
the pastor's conduct was extreme and outrageous and Frank's resultant distress severe are dis-
puted facts of no particular relevance to the first amendment defense. 
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It is uncontested that two days later Frank attempted suicide, 
although the seriousness of his attempt remains unclear. 
Pastor Kehr, who is insured against damages arising from his 
counseling activities through the National Council of Mainstream 
Truthful Churches, 12 is represented by a large law firm from the near-
est metropolis. His lawyers have already filed a motion to dismiss, 
relying solely upon the free exercise clause of the first amendment.13 
Although you have never heard of "clergy malpractice" and are in-
clined to doubt that such a cause of action should ever be recog-
12. Although lawsuits stemming from spiritual counseling have been few, see notes 1-2 supra 
and 15 infra, in recent years a great many religious organizations and individual counselors have 
begun purchasing "clergy malpractice insurance." See H. MALONY, T. NEEDHAM & S. SOUTH· 
ARD, supra note 1, at 123-35; Bernstein, supra note 1, at 56; Breecher, supra note 1, at 11; Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 508-10. The relative paucity of suits to date may be attributable in part to 
the impression that religious organizations are immune from suit. Most states, however, have 
eliminated such immunity. See note 19 infra. Another reason may be the typically modest per-
sonal means of spiritual counselors. This factor becomes irrelevant once counselors are insured 
against liability for counseling activities. 
One press report on the clergy malpractice insurance phenomenon observes that a "safe risk 
is a powerful bait" for insurance companies, and does not mention the filing of any claims. 
Freedman, Malpractice Approaches the Pulpit, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1982, at F8, col. 5 (city ed.). 
According to John Cleary, an attorney for Church Mutual Insurance Company, 
In the past two years, only about six actions alleging wrongful counseling have been 
brought against ministers covered by Church Mutual, which insures 27,000 churches in 35 
states .... The low-risk potential has made clerical-malpractice insurance a bargain; $25 to 
$35 on a policy with $100,000 to $300,000 liability coverage are ballpark figures for the 
industry .... 
"The true value in coverage really is in paying the costs of defense," he adds, "They're 
very minimal risks." 
Natl. L.J., July 16, 1984, at 9, 31, col. 1. Nonetheless, a growing awareness of this new "deep 
pocket" may be "powerful bait" for plaintiffs' attorneys, even as individuals overcome their re-
luctance to sue spiritual counselors. See Carey, Faith and the Law, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1985, at 1, 
col. 1 (" 'There was always the reluctance to sue a member of the clergy,' says Lee Boothby, a 
Michigan attorney ...• 'Lawyers wouldn't even take such cases. That inhibition has left com-
pletely.'"). This trend can only be accelerated by opinions such as Nally v. Grace Community 
Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (deleted from official reporter by California 
Supreme Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984)) {holding that there can be no free exercise 
defense to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims). Cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST!· 
TUTIONAL LAW 80 (Supp. 1979) ("As the ~otion of what is religious expands ••• and as more 
diverse forms of religious consciousness emerge, the number of confrontations between religion 
and an increasingly pervasive state must grow.'') {footnote omitted). 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... .''). It is the free exercise clause rather than the 
establishment clause that is implicated by tort actions against spiritual counselors. In Professor 
Tribe's terms, if the spiritual counselor's conduct at the time of the alleged tort was "arguably 
non-religious" it does not implicate the establishment clause. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU· 
TIONAL LAW§ 14-6, at 828 (1978); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (heavy 
reliance on existence of "legitimate secular purposes" in upholding inclusion of creche in city 
Christmas display). However, if the spiritual counselor's conduct was "arguably religious," it 
implicates free exercise concerns. L. TRIBE, supra, § 14-6, at 828; see also Walz v. Tax Commn., 
397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two 
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a 
logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."); Van Patten, In the End ls the Beginning: 
An Inquiry into the Meaning of the Religion Clauses, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 87 (1983) ("In 
conflicts between free exercise and nonestablishment, the free exercise principle should be pre-
ferred .... "). 
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nized, 14 your judicial instincts tell you that the first amendment 
cannot excuse intentional torts of this nature. Yet, you are reluctant 
to assume that the first amendment has nothing to do with this case. 
How do you rule on the motion to dismiss? Under what, circum-
stances might the first amendment be a defense to allegations of this 
nature? 
Although these facts are similar to - and somewhat more plausi-
ble than - facts that have been presented with increasing frequency in 
actual cases, you will have little luck finding judicial precedent that 
provides direct and reasoned answers to these questions. 15 There is 
authority, however, in the form of indirect precedent and general first 
amendment and tort principles. From this authority, clear and worka-
14. See note 8 supra. 
15. In the Nally case, discussed in notes 1-2 supra, the court relied upon three recent cases 
(none concerned with spiritual counseling per se) in which religious organizations raised the first 
amendment as a defense to allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lewis v. 
Holy Spirit Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity, 589 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Mass. 1983) 
("brainwashing and indoctrination" led to "severe psychiatric disorders"); Turner v. Unification 
Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.R.I. 1978), affd. per curiam, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(plaintiff held against her will and compelled to work long hours without pay for approximately a 
year, which led to "grave physical, emotional, and economic harm"); Christofferson v. Church of 
Scientology of Portland, 57 Or. App. 203, 205, 644 P.2d 577, 580 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1206, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983) ("scheme to gain control of [plaintiff's] mind and to force her into a 
life of service to defendants and a course of retaliatory conduct after plaintiff disassociated herself 
from defendants"). In all three cases, the complaints were held insufficient to state a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; any assertions that a first amendment defense would 
be invalid were therefore dicta. 
The Lewis court construed a "seriously flawed" complaint that alleged "brainwashing" as an 
attempt to plead intentional infliction of emotional distress, but then held the pleading insuffi-
cient without commenting on the first amendment's relevance. 589 F. Supp. at 12. 
The Turner court "initially [found] that the free exercise clause of the first amendment does 
not immunize the defendants from causes of action that allege involuntary servitude or inten-
tional tortious activity. . . . However, examination reveals, the plaintiff has failed to state any 
claims upon which relief may be granted." 473 F. Supp. at 371. 
That religious defendants are not immune from suit need not inlply that there is never a 
privilege for particular conduct in which they may engage. See notes 19 & 109 infra and accom-
panying text. In reviewing the Turner decision, the First Circuit noted, "We need not and do not 
pass upon the correctness of the lower court's preliminary description of the bearing of the first 
amendment in cases such as this." 602 F.2d at 458. 
In Christo.fferson, the court held "as a matter oflaw that the conduct shown is not actionable 
as outrageous conduct, whether viewed as individual acts or as a course of conduct." 57 Or. 
App. at 227, 644 P.2d at 593. 
Two recent cases have upheld the sufficiency of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims against religious groups. In Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. 
Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982), the court dismissed a claim based on counseling but allowed a claim 
based on harassment of plaintiff after she left the group. See note 103 infra. A second case, 
Meroni v. Holy Spirit Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity, 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 480 
N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1984), held: 
This court does not make a determination in any sense as to the underlying beliefs or 
faith of the Unification Church; however, for the purposes of this motion, merely indicates 
that the alleged recruitment policies and action of defendant as claimed by plaintiff insofar 
as it is alleged the church knew the decedent, Meroni, was emotionally disturbed and there-
after subjected him to a process of "brainwashing" which resulted in an emotional break-
down ... does state a cause of action under our law. 
125 Misc. 2d at 1067, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 710; see note 101 infra. 
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ble guidelines for the treatment of a first amendment defense to a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of spir-
itual counseling can be pieced together. This Note reviews that au-
thority and compiles those guidelines. 
Part I explains the extent to which courts are competent to decide 
the threshold question of whether particular conduct is religious. Part 
II describes the balancing test put forward by the Supreme Court for 
evaluating free exercise claims, and derives criteria relevant to spiri-
tual counseling from cases involving such claims. Part III summarizes 
the pertinent criteria and reviews the ways they may be employed to 
systematize the treatment of spiritual counseling cases. 
I. THE THRESHOLD QUESTION: Is THE CONDUCT RELIGIOUS? 
The threshold question whenever the free exercise clause is in-
voked is whether the contested conduct16 is religious.17 In the spiri-
tual counseling context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the 
defendant can show that the conduct that allegedly caused plaintiff's 
distress was in fact "part of the beliefs and practices"18 of the religious 
group. 
To place the inquiry in a clearer light, it may be helpful to review 
what a first amendment defense does not entail. It do~s not mean that 
religious institutions are immune from tort liability. 19 Those who in-
16. As a practical matter, it is only conduct, rather than belief, that creates free exercise 
problems. Until belief is manifested in conduct, it cannot possibly offend the law or any person. 
To speak of constitutional protection for religious belief is thus misleading at best; it is nonethe· 
less common. See note 37 infra. 
In a similar sense, the Supreme Court's oft-quoted distinction between conduct and speech, 
see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), "has no real content. All communication 
except perhaps that of the extrasensory variety involves conduct." L. TRIBE, supra note 13, § 12· 
7 at 599. 
17. See Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 754 
(1984) ("The claimant in a standard free exercise case, urging that his religious beliefs or activi-
ties are being inhibited, needs to show that those beliefs or activities ••. are religious."). 
While analytically distinct, the preliminary inquiry into whether a practice is religious is 
often merged with the consequential inquiry into whether an assertedly religious practice is bur-
dened by state action. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-57 (1982) ("The prelimi-
nary inquiry in determining the existence of a constitutionally required exemption is whether the 
payment of social security taxes and the receipt of benefits interferes with the free exercise rights 
of the Amish."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("We turn first to the question 
whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant's 
religion."). The consequential inquiry is deferred to Part II of this Note. 
18. Christolferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 57 Or. App. 203, 245, 644 P.2d 577, 
604 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983). 
19. At one time, religious organizations were cloaked in a "charitable immunity" from tort 
liability, which did not rely upon any constitutional grounds. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 895E comments b & c (1977). This immunity has been widely rejected in recent years 
in conformity with the Restatement's view that "[o]ne engaged in a charitable, educational, reli-
gious, or benevolent enterprise or activity is not for that reason immune from tort liability." Id. 
at§ 895E; see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 133 at 1070 (W. Keeton, 
5th ed. 1984) ("Only two or three states in recent years have insisted on retaining the full immu-
nity in the absence of legislation to the contrary. Even in some of these states, however, the 
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vite the public into their temples, synagogues, and churches, for exam-
ple, are under the same duty to maintain safe premises as are other 
persons.20 Nor may the first amendment be construed to create a 
blanket tort immunity for those individuals vested with religious au-
thority. Just as members of the clergy may receive traffic tickets, they, 
and the institutions they serve, may be sued for torts they commit. 21 
Raising the first amendment as a defense does entail a claim that 
legitimate religious beliefs and practices are at issue in the case. 22 
While the first amendment forbids courts from deciding religious ques-
tions, 23 courts may make several determinations to ascertain whether 
a question of religion has in fact been raised by a given set of facts. 
First, courts may hold that a first amendment defense is inapplicable 
because the beliefs or practices in question are properly classed with 
secular philosophy,24 culture,25 or even aesthetics26 rather than with 
immunity is only formally complete, since statutes provide a method for reaching any liability 
insurance funds covering the charity.") (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND 
KEETON]; Caldeira, Changing the Common Law: Effects of the Decline of Charitable Immunity, 
16 LAW & SocY. REv. 669-70 n.1 (1981-82) ("Thirty-one states, through either the legislature or 
the state supreme court, have removed the immunity of charitable organizations."). 
20. See, e.g., Heath v. First Baptist Church, 341 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cerL denied, 
348 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1977) (allowing negligence action against church for slip and fall in church 
building); Fintak v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 51 Ill. App. 3d 191, 366 N.E.2d 480 (1971) 
(holding defendant religious corporation negligent and liable for injuries suffered from slip and 
fall in church aisle); Morgan v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 402 So. 2d 640 (La. 1981) 
(defendant church negligent and strictly liable to plaintiff who fell down eight-inch step in 
church building). 
21. See, e.g., Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co., 370 So. 2d 5ll, 514 (La. 1979) (church responsible for 
negligence of pastor who created an unreasonable risk of injury by not clearing aisles of praying 
parishioners to make way for the "running or moving 'in the Spirit' [which] were common forms 
of religious expression in Shepard's Fold Church"); Schoen v. Kerner, 544 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1976) (charitable immunity defense unavailable to individual priests who failed to warn or 
to abate dangerous condition in rectory); cf. Meroni v. Holy Spirit Assn. for the Unification of 
World Christianity, 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 1067, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710 (Sup. Ct. 1984) ("That one 
performs a tort or commits a crime in the furtherance of a 'religious' activity or as part of a 
religious belief does not confer immunity upon such alleged wrongdoer."). 
22. Efforts to define "religion" in the abstract are perhaps inevitably futile. See Freeman, 
The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983). 
The Constitution nonetheless places upon the courts construing it the burden of distinguishing 
the "free exercise of religion" from other phenomena. 
23. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872) ("It is of the essence of ... religious 
unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among them-
selves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only 
to such appeals as the organism itself provides for."); see also Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (The first 
amendment "commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving under-
lying controversies over religious doctrine."). 
24. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (courts must decide ifthe individ-
ual's belief is religious for purposes of conscientious objection to military service). 
25. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("A way oflife, however virtuous and 
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier ... to state regulations .•. if it is based on purely 
secular considerations .... "). 
26. See Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357, 359 (8th Cir. 1975) (long, braided hair is a matter of 
Indian religion rather than a secular matter of personal preference). 
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religious beliefs or practices. While these distinctions are surely legiti-
mate, they must just as surely be resorted to cautiously to avoid defin-
ing unconventional religions out of legal existence.27 
Second, courts may pass judgment upon whether a professed reli-
gious belief is sincerely held. 28 This is perhaps the most important and 
most difficult finding courts must make to distinguish legitimate ap-
peals to the free exercise clause from beliefs or conduct undeserving of 
constitutional protection. 
Finally,29 courts may determine whether the particular conduct at 
27. The Supreme Court has maintained a deferential approach to this inquiry. In United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Court reasoned: "It is not within 'the judicial function 
and judicial competence' ... to determine whether appellee or the Government has the proper 
interpretation of the Amish faith . . . . We therefore accept appellee's contention that both 
payment and receipt of social security benefits is forbidden by the Amish faith." 455 U.S. at 257 
(citation omitted). 
To be "religious," beliefs need not be conventional, see United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 
165-66 (1965) (conscientious objector status not limited to those who believe in "God"), nor 
coherent and systematic, see Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 715 (1981) (to be "religious,'' beliefs need not be "articulated with the clarity and precision 
that a more sophisticated person might employ"), nor familiar and well-established, see Stevens 
v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The Stevens court explained: 
Delicacy in probing and sensitivity to permissible diversity is required, lest established 
creeds and dogmas be given an advantage over new and changing modes of religious belief. 
Neither the trappings of robes, nor temples of stone, nor a fixed liturgy, nor an extensive 
literature or history is required to meet the test of beliefs cognizable under the Constitution 
as religious. 
428 F. Supp. at 900. 
28. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), held that the issue of the truth or falsity of 
defendants' religious beliefs could not be submitted to a jury at a criminal trial for mail fraud. 
The district court had permitted the jury to rule on whether the defendants sincerely believed the 
statements they made, viz. that they were divine messengers with extensive healing powers. 
Although the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the propriety of allowing jury determina-
tion of sincerity, Ballard is routinely cited for the now commonplace proposition that sincerity of 
religious belief is a prerequisite to a first amendment claim. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 
2d 716, 726, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964) (en bane) (sincere belief in peyotism); 
In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588, 590 (1963) (contempt of court conviction 
reversed when contemner "convincingly demonstrated her sincerity by preferring jail to the com-
promise of her religious faith"). 
29. An additional inquiry, into the "centrality" of a given practice within a religion, was 
undertaken in the celebrated case of People v. Woody, 61Cal.2d 716, 722, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 
Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964) (en bane) ("To forbid the use of peyote is to remove the theological heart 
of Peyotism."). Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (The Amish "concept oflife 
aloof from the world and its values is central to their faith."). One commentator has recognized 
that "the Yoder 'centrality' test ... is spurious at best. The truly central tenets of the Amish faith 
concern matters of ritual and faith, not the practical problems of guiding children through ado-
lescence." Stambor, Manifest Destiny and American Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoyah, 
Badoni, and the Drowned Gods, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 59, 68 (1982) (emphasis in original). 
To the extent that inquiry into centrality is an effort to determine what is genuinely religious, 
as opposed to merely "incidental parts of religious belief,'' it is "beyond the practical and institu-
tional competence of courts." Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A 
Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 360 (1980) (citations omitted). To the extent 
that centrality indicates the weightiness of a particular burden on religion, see Part II infra, 
rather than whether the practice is religious, the inquiry may be both legitimate and necessary in 
some free exercise cases. This Note, however, undertakes no inquiry into the "centrality" of 
spiritual counseling. 
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issue in a case was merely secular conduct in a religious context. 30 
Spiritual counseling is a hybrid process, combining elements of both 
religious practice and secular learning.31 As a matter of constitutional 
law, such activity cannot be immunized from judicial scrutiny solely 
by virtue of its religious context. 32 Because allegations of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress must include particularized instances of 
"outrageous conduct" to which the plaintiff's distress is causally 
linked,33 the judicial inquiry must focus on whether the particular 
counseling conduct at issue is religious. Unless the particular conduct 
alleged to have caused the plaintiff's distress was dictated by religious 
beliefs or carried out in conformity with religious practice, the conduct 
was not the "exercise of religion" and does not enjoy constitutional 
protection. 
Depending on a case's facts, these simple principles may lead to / 
several different outcomes. First, the free exercise defense may be ex-
posed as frivolous if there is no religious conduct at issue. Second, 
despite prima facie legitimacy, the affirmative defense may be with-
drawn by a religious group unwilling to assert that its beliefs and prac-
tices dictate or condone the infliction of severe distress by spiritual 
counselors. 34 
30. See Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 293 Or. App. 203, 245, 644 P.2d 
577, 604 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983) ("The question which the jury 
was required to decide in this case was whether, even though the Mission is a religious organiza-
tion, it offered the services in question here on a wholly non-religious basis."). 
31. See notes 6-7 supra. 
32. A religious context does not immunize a dispute from judicial scrutiny any more than a 
religious defendant does. See notes 19-21 supra. A policy of strict deference to religion, see P. 
KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 112 (1962) (The Constitution's religion clauses "prohibit 
classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden."), would set an 
impossibly stringent standard. See Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of 
Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1378, 1383 n.17 (1981) ("[E)ven neutral govern-
ment actions may, in fact, impose greater burdens on some religions."). The Supreme Court has 
never required strict deference to religion. 
At least with respect to disputes concerning religious property, the Supreme Court has ap-
proved the "neutral principles oflaw" approach, which requires a civil court to examine religious 
documents "in purely secular terms .... If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments 
. . . would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to 
the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." Jones v. Wolf, 443 
U.S. 595, 604 (1979). 
A similar approach has been adopted in disputes over church discipline. See Serbian E. Or-
thodox Diocese for the U.S. and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (first amendment 
disallows court involvement in hierarchical church's defrockment of a bishop); First Baptist 
Church v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (courts may apply presumption that majority 
of members rule in a congregational church, but first amendment disallows further involvement 
in disciplinary matters). 
33. See note 2 supra. But see Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. 
Rptr. 661 (1985) (en bane) (California Supreme Court for the first time allowing recovery for the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress without requiring that injury be a "sudden occurrence"). 
34. See Answer to Petition for Hearing for Plaintiff-Appellants at 3, Nally v. Grace Commu-
nity Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (deleted from official reporter by California 
Supreme Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984)) ("Defendant's [sic] have not said that it is a 
religious privilege to exacerbate feelings of guilt or that the exacerbation was a result of religious 
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Yet another possibility is that a plaintiff may willingly concede, or 
a defendant may demonstrate, that defendant's religion sanctions the 
conduct alleged. In such a case, plaintiff challenges defendant's legal 
right to inflict distress upon plaintiff or anyone, regardless of motiva-
tion. Implicit in such claims may be plaintiff's disbelief in defendant's 
religion and a conviction that defendant has no right to proselytize by 
tortious means. 
Finally, plaintiff and defendant may share the same faith, but differ 
on whether their religion condones the conduct that occurred in this 
instance. Defendant's sincere religious justification for particular dis-
tressing conduct should suffice to support a holding that the conduct 
was religious for the purposes of a free exercise defense. To hold 
otherwise would be tantamount to deciding a theological question 
upon which two members of the same faith differ - whether the dis-
tressing conduct has a religious justification - and this the courts may 
not do.35 
Of course, a court's decision that contested conduct is religious by 
no means assures that the court will ultimately protect the religious 
defendant from liability. This step does assure, however, that plainly 
religious conduct - as well as arguably religious conduct that courts 
are not competent to classify more definitely - receives all due con-
sideration under the free exercise clause. That consideration is prop-
erly the primary focus of free exercise analysis. The remainder of this 
Note examines the essential elements of the inquiry into whether there 
are valuable religious freedoms burdened by a policy of permitting re-
covery for intentional infliction of emotional distress by spiritual coun-
conviction. Instead they have denied the exascerbation [sic] and thus raise a question of fact that 
does not challenge their religious beliefs."). 
Of course, a defendant can deny committing the tort and still claim that a free exercise de· 
fense applies if liability is established. See FED. R. C1v. P. 8(e)(2) (allowing pleading in the 
alternative). The first amendment may not be invoked, however, until the defendant presents 
evidence that commission of this tort is "free exercise of religion" according to that defendant's 
religious doctrine and practice. Though technically not an admission, this showing would be 
inconsistent with a denial that the practice in question has been or could well be engaged in by 
the defendant. 
A recent Oklahoma case is instructive on this point. A divorced mother was awarded 
$205,000 actual and $185,000 punitive damages for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress after she was denounced for the "sin of fornication" from the church pulpit. 
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1984, at Al5, col. 1 (city ed.) (discussing Guinn v. Collinsville Church 
of Christ, No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa County, Okla. Mar. 15, 1984), appeal docketed, No. 
62,154 (Okla. Apr. 11, 1984)); see generally Note, When Fundamental Rights Collide: Guinn v. 
Collinsville Church of Christ, 21 TULSA L.J. 157 (1985) (same). Unlike the Nally defendants, 
the defendant church elders in the Oklahoma case did not deny that their religious faith dictated 
their tortious conduct. After the verdict, one elder said: "This isn't going to shake our faith. 
We've [disciplined church members] for 2,000 years, and we'll continue to do it." Id. (quoting 
Elder Ron Witten). Another elder said: "I know why I did what I did, and I felt that after our 
testimony, everyone would understand. They don't understand the Scriptures and the responsi· 
bilities and obligations we have." Id. (quoting Elder Allen Cash). 
35. See note 23 supra. 
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selors, and, if so, whether compelling state interests served by that 
policy outweigh the burden. 
II. ELEMENTS OF THE BALANCING TEsT 
A finding that a spiritual counselor's allegedly tortious conduct 
was dictated by a sincere religious belief "is only the beginning ... and 
not the end of the inquiry."36 The Supreme Court has consistently 
held that while matters of religious doctrine and belief are absolutely 
protected by the first amendment, religious conduct is not. 37 In recent 
cases, the Court has allowed the state to impose burdens on free exer-
cise interests when essential to further "compelling state interests."38 
Constraints on religious conduct that impinges upon public conven-
ience39 or impedes the efficiency of large governmental programs have 
been held constitutional.40 Although even criminal conduct may be 
36. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). 
37. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (The Constitution's religion clause 
"embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in 
the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protec-
tion of society."); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("The conduct or actions 
so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order."); 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) ("[T]he freedom to act, even when the action is in 
accord with one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions."). But see 
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 631 n.2 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[F]or purposes of 
defining the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause a sharp distinction cannot be made 
between religious belief and religiously motivated action •... "); L. TRIBE, supra note 13, §14-8 
at 838 n.13 ("It is somewhat peculiar ..• that the distinction between belief and action would 
arise at all in the free exercise context, for the guarantee refers explicitly to the exercise of religion 
and would thus seem to extend by its own terms beyond thought and talk.") (emphasis in 
original). 
38. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("[A]ny incidental burden on the free exer-
cise of ... religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject 
within the State's constitutional power to regulate ... .' ");see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 
252, 257-58 (1982) ("The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is 
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 214 (1972) (Where state action "interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it 
must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its require-
ment, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause.''). 
39. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 
(1981) (upholding regulation of proselytizing and religious fundraising that impedes free move-
ment of large crowds at state fair). 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying religious exemption from 
participation in social security system); see also Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986) (denying 
religious exemption from disclosing social security number to receive welfare benefits); Penner v. 
King, 695 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. 1985) (en bane) (denying religious exemption from disclosing social 
security number to receive driver's license); Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 902 (1979) (denying religious exemption from disclosing social security number to receive 
welfare benefits); cf. Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1984) (remanding for finding of 
actual cost of accommodation). But see Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), affd. 
per curiam without opinion, 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985) (granting religious exemption from supplying 
photograph for driver's license); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting 
religious exemption from disclosing social security number to receive welfare benefits). 
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privileged to protect a significant free exercise interest,41 "[n]ot all bur-
dens on religion are unconstitutional. "42 
Making spiritual counselors answerable in secular courts for prac-
tices dictated by their religion undoubtedly "interferes with [their] free 
exercise rights."43 This burden, however, is constitutional if the state's 
interest in compensating counselees for distress imposed by spiritual 
counselors is so compelling as to justify the burdens thereby imposed 
upon the process, practitioners, and beneficiaries of spiritual 
counseling. 
A. The Burden on Free Exercise 
Assuming that no religious conduct can enjoy absolute protection 
from legal scrutiny or legal penalties, and that the conduct at issue has 
been found to be religious, how grave a constitutional matter is it· to 
impose tort liability upon spiritual counselors for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress? 
Allowing adjudication of such claims places a direct burden on 
religious freedom by forcing spiritual counselors and religious organi-
zations to defend their religious practices in court. Discomfort or in-
convenience occasioned in this manner, however, will not intrude in 
any serious way upon a spiritual counselor's work. Even allowing re-
covery against a religious defendant is not in itself a heavy burden 
upon free exercise; the rare counselor who is neither insured nor 
backed by a large denominational organization is unlikely to have 
enough personal wealth to be worth suing.44 
However, allowing sincere religious counsel to be questioned and 
penalized in court creates two more serious burdens. In a direct way, 
such intrusion undermines religious authority and places the court in 
the position of overseeing and regulating religious practices. 45 Less 
directly, publicity attending tort suits founded on counseling conduct 
tends to distort the counseling process itself.46 
41. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (en bane) (mem· 
hers of Native American Church may use peyote in well-established religious ceremony). But see 
United States v. Spears, 443 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972) (defen· 
dant failed to establish a religious justification for the use of illegal drugs); Leary v. United States, 
383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), revd. on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (same). For a discussion 
of Leary, see Comment, Free Exercise: Religion Goes to ''Pot," 56 CALIF. L. REV. 100 (1968). 
42. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). 
43. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). 
44. See note 12 supra. 
45. Cf Brief of Defendant-Respondents at 22, Nally v. Grace Community Church of the 
Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (deleted from official reporter by California Supreme Court, see 
157 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984)) ("Judicial application of a standard of care to a pastor's counseling 
ministry would . . . restrict the pastor's calling by inhibiting his communication of religious 
truths, thereby restricting both his and the counselee's religious freedom."). 
46. Cf Poll Finds Doctors Fear Being Sued, Cut Services, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 19, 1985, 
at A3, col. 6 ("66 percent of family physicians who deliver babies either have stopped or plan to 
reduce that part of their practice, mainly because of the malpractice question"). 
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The latter, indirect, burden raises the more significant constitu-
tional concern. The rapidity with which clergy malpractice insurance 
has taken hold is evidence of the depth of concern in the clerical com-
munity over the (insubstantial, to date) threat posed to it by the civil 
courts.47 Those whose most valuable capital is their reputation for 
trustworthiness, good sense, and high moral character may be, at 
times, too easily swayed by a desire to preserve that reputation.48 The 
prospect of lawsuits brought by disaffected counselees will inevitably 
cause a certain amount of "self-censorship"49 among counselors, who 
may avoid moral confrontation through a retreat to the kind of com-
fortable "half-truths" that, in their view,50 are already available from 
secular counselors. 
Freely allowing lawsuits against spiritual counselors will have the 
incidental but inevitable effect of discouraging the transmission of 
pragmatic religious doctrine to those who seek help coping with the 
normal stresses and losses of life. While there is no absolute constitu-
tional right of spiritual counselors to be free of this burden, the burden 
is a weighty one. At the least, this "chilling effect" is as serious as 
would be a comparable effect upon preaching, proselytizing, or other 
such religious conduct. 51 
B. The Counterweight - Understanding the State's Interest 
By providing a cause of action to vindicate the individual's interest 
in remaining free of severe emotional distress, the state acknowledges 
a significant interest in intervening on behalf of counselees who have 
experienced distress at the hands of spiritual counselors. In hearing 
these claims, however, the courts cannot ignore the burden that disal-
lowing any first amendment defense would place on the free exercise 
rights of spiritual counselors. 
47. See note 12 supra. 
48. According to "a recent survey of lay and clergy opinions concerning the ministry ... 
pastors are regarded above all else as persons who serve without regard for acclaim. As for 
pastoral counselors, they are described more in terms of personal characteristics than skills. 
Counselors are to be compassionate, humble, understanding, and honest." H. MALONY, T. 
NEEDHAM & s. SOUTHARD, supra note 1, at 66. 
49. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
50. W. OATES, PASTORAL CouNSELING 27 (1974) ("The pastoral counselor insists upon the 
whole counsel of God as over against half-truths .... insisting on acceptance of the ambiguity of 
human suffering •... ") (emphasis in original). 
51. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) ("[T]he right to the free exercise of 
religion unquestionably encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar 
religious functions."). Whether spiritual counseling is such a "similar religious function" is an 
open question. See Petition for Hearing of Defendants-Respondents at 38, Nally v. Grace Com-
munity Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (deleted from official reporter by Califor-
nia Supreme Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984)) (arguing that counseling is essentially a 
"private sermon," just as a sermon is "mass counseling," and citing Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 
U.S. 67 (1953) (striking down law prohibiting sermons in a public park on first amendment 
grounds)). 
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Part I of this Note suggested that there are two quite distinct ways 
in which a plaintiff might respond to a defendant spiritual counselor's 
legitimate recourse to the free exercise clause.52 One response, which 
one may more easily imagine being made by a plaintiff who does not 
share defendant's religious faith, is that a religious motivation does not 
justify the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The other re-
sponse, which may only properly be attributed to one who shares de-
fendant's faith, is that nothing in the shared faith justifies defendant's 
tortious conduct. The first response raises a legal question as to the 
limits of the free exercise clause. The second raises primarily, if not 
solely, a religious issue concerning the true meaning or implications of 
the teachings of a particular faith. 
Ideally, the issue of whether the state's interest in involving itself in 
the dispute is compelling should be responsive to whether the core 
dispute is in fact a legal one - as to which the court's competence is 
unquestioned - or a religious one - as to which it has no compe-
tence. In the former case, a straightforward reading of the free exer-
cise clause would seem to forbid efforts to further the goals of one's 
faith by tortious assaults upon nonbelievers. 53 In the latter case, the 
establishment clause and the free exercise clause both appear to re-
quire courts to defer to religious authority on religious questions. 
Thus, one might argue that, in a contest of religion against nonreligion 
(or a competing religion), the state's interest in protecting individuals 
is compelling; in the intrasectarian contest, it is not. 
There are, however, difficulties with this simple analysis. First, it 
seems to require the plaintiff to make out the defense by conceding the 
truth of defendant's religion. Second, courts are unlikely to defer as 
readily or as completely to religious authority when tortious invasions 
of individual rights have occurred as they have in disputes involving 
church property or discipline. 54 
In the following subsections, this Note argues that courts faced 
with free exercise claims have, often tacitly, relied heavily upon 
whether the person disadvantaged by religious conduct is a member of 
the religious group in question. As a result, the difficult problem of 
deference to religious authority arises only when a plaintiff was a 
group member at the time of the alleged tort. 
1. The Nonmember Plaintiff 
Case law and common sense suggest that intentional torts commit-
ted in the name of religion against those who are not members of the 
52. See text at note 35 supra. 
53. See section II.B. l infra. 
54. The courts only intervene in disputes over church property and discipline to the extent 
that they may do so without resolving underlying disputes over religious doctrine. See notes 23 
& 32supra. 
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offending religious group cannot be protected by the free exercise 
clause. In general terms, "[p]erhaps the most obvious limit [on reli-
gious action] is that acts cannot be tolerated that involve significant 
harm to nonconsenting third parties."55 
In one sense, toleration of such conduct would be tantamount to 
an establishment of religion because it would encourage groups in-
clined toward violent proselytization to aggrandize themselves by 
preying upon the weak. 56 In a more immediate sense, the free exercise 
clause cannot permit courts to protect conduct that itself infringes the 
free exercise rights of others by employing coercion to change religious 
beliefs. 57 A free exercise interest in freedom from coercion reinforced 
by an establishment clause requirement of neutrality is at work in the 
Supreme Court's intolerance of prayer in public schools, 58 and of state 
laws prohibiting the teaching of evolution. 59 This same dynamic man-
dates that the courts protect nonmember tort victims. 
Furthermore, recent cases have shown that the extent of harm to 
third parties sufficient to override a free exercise interest falls far short 
of the harm necessary to state a cause of action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. In some cases, a mere inconveniencing of a 
portion of the general public has sufficed to justify curtailment of reli-
gious conduct. 60 
Therefore, a first amendment defense to intentional tort claims 
should always fail when asserted against a plaintiff who was not a 
group member at the time of the tort. The same rule may be derived 
from the courts' treatment of cases in which tortious conduct was di-
rected at ex-members of the offending group. While the member/non-
member criterion has not been expressly relied upon in these cases, 
courts consistently hold that aggression against ex-members is unpro-
tected by the free exercise clause. 61 On the other hand, judicial reluc-
55. S. Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 
UTAH L. REV. 309, 370-71. 
56. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l, 15 (1947) (establishment clause forbids Jaws 
that "prefer one religion over another"). 
57. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein."). 
58. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("When the power, prestige and financial 
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure 
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."). 
59. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
60. See Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) 
(upholding regulation of proselytizing and religious fundraising that impedes free movement of 
large crowds at state fair). 
61. See, e.g., Van Schaik v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 
1982) (allowing intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for harassment of ex-member); 
Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975) (allowing claim for 
interference with business relations and alienation of affections for shunning of excommunicant). 
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tance to become involved in internal religious disciplinary matters 
suggests that a different rule should apply to member-plaintiff cases. 62 
2. The Member Plaintiff 
As the previous subsection shows, the nonmember-plaintiff case is 
easily resolved - the free exercise defense should be rejected. A more 
difficult problem is raised by the much more common circumstance of 
the plaintiff who was a member of the spiritual counselor's religious 
group at the time of the allegedly tortious conduct. While nonmember 
plaintiffs can paint vivid images of violent proselytization or crusading 
religious retribution, a member plaintiff presumptively professed the 
same beliefs and adhered to the same practices as are now put forward 
in defense of the spiritual counselor's conduct. The member plaintiff 
presents a picture less of naked aggression than of acquiescence, fol-
lowed by second thoughts and theological disagreement. This is a 
much less compelling case for governmental intervention than the 
nonmember's, and a much more appealing case for recognizing a free 
exercise defense. 
a. Free exercise precedent: the Supreme Court's neutrality cases. 
While it is intuitively plausible that group membership should play a 
part in free exercise analysis, the cases provide little guidance on how 
- or how much - membership should be taken into account. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the assertion of religious au-
thority over members of religious groups and the proper posture of the 
civil courts when a group member subsequently seeks to challenge 
such assertions of authority in court. 63 These cases hold that the civil 
courts may apply an otherwise legal provision regardless of religious 
context, so long as this application does not require the courts to con-
strue religious doctrine. 64 
However, a court cannot remedy religiously motivated intentional 
infliction of emotional distress without, in effect, taking sides in a reli-
gious dispute. 65 The principles of neutrality developed by the 
Supreme Court are, therefore, of no use here. Only if the conduct in 
question had been held not to be religious could the court avoid in-
quiry into religious doctrine while awarding damages against a spiri-
tual counselor for counseling conduct. 66 
62. See note 32 supra. Cf. O'Moore v. Driscoll, 135 Cal. App. 770, 776, 28 P.2d 438, 441 
(1933) (excessive church discipline "had no tendency to spread the gospel" and was thus beyond 
the scope of church authority). 
63. See note 32 supra. 
64. E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) ("'neutral principles of law' approach is 
consistent with ... constitutional principles"); Maryland & Va. Churches of God v. Sharpsburg 
Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per curiam) (construction of church charters and constitution 
involves "no inquiry into religious doctrine"). 
65. See text at notes 52-54 supra. 
66. See Part I supra. 
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Furthermore, spiritual counseling presents difficulties that the 
Supreme Court has not addressed. Courts have struggled toward neu-
tral methods of dispute resolution when legal documents, such as trust 
instruments and corporate charters, were available to be construed. 67 
The same courts may throw up their hands when religious authority is 
exercised through the relatively informal, ad hoc application of doc-
trine or adaptation of religious practice. 68 Moreover, the right to be 
free of severe emotional distress is of a different order from the rights 
of property and contract at stake in the "neutrality" decisions. Thus, 
these cases provide no guidance on whether the state's interest in inter-
vening in spiritual counseling disputes is compelling. 
b. Wisconsin v. Yoder: deference when neutrality is impossible. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in the leading free exercise case of Wis-
consin v. Yoder 69 is not as clear and consistent as one might wish. 
Nonetheless, Yoder may provide guidance as to the effect that group 
membership should have on free exercise analysis. Specifically, one 
implicit holding is that even an otherwise compelling state interest in 
intervening on behalf of an individual who, in the state's view, has 
been seriously harmed by a religious group must sometimes give way 
to the group's free exercise interest when the individual is a member of 
that group. 
In Yoder, the Supreme Court upheld a free exercise exemption to a 
generally valid and unquestionably important law. Defendants, in obe-
dience to the rules of their religious community, failed to send their 
children to high school and were fined five dollars each for violating 
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law, which required par-
ents to "cause" their children to attend public or private school until 
age sixteen.70 Six of the seven participating justices71 refused to inter-
vene in the religious group's exercise of authority (through the par-
ents) over the individual group members who were, in the state's view, 
seriously harmed by their removal from school. This holding thus 
holds out some hope for spiritual counselors whose counseling is ques-
tioned in court by member counselees. 
The issue posed in Yoder was whether the "state's interest in uni-
versal compulsory education"72 is overcome by the Amish free exer-
cise interest. How strong the state interest is perceived to be depends 
upon how heavily one weighs the interest of the individual Amish chil-
dren and upon who is permitted to characterize the harm that may 
befall them if they are removed from school. 
67. See notes 23, 32, 64 supra and cases cited therein. 
68. See note 6 supra. 
69. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
70. 406 U.S. at 207-08 n.2. 
71. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., did not participate. 
72. 406 U.S. at 215. 
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Justice Douglas, in his dissent, viewed the state interest as essen-
tially identical to that of the Amish children, some of whom may have 
preferred to remain in school.73 The Court viewed the children's in-
terests as legally irrelevant, except insofar as they were subsumed in 
those of their parents and the rest of the Amish community. The state 
of Wisconsin characterized the children's leaving school as seriously 
harmful; the Amish community characterized it as beneficial. The 
Court accepted the Amish characterization; accordingly it viewed the 
state interest in this case as minimal74 and easily outweighed by the 
strong countervailing free exercise interest. 75 By characterizing the in-
terests at stake in this way, the Court implicitly acknowledged the def-
73. Justice Douglas contended that the children should have been granted standing in the 
case. He worried that if a child is "harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over 
him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed." 406 U.S. at 
245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas noted that only one of the children of the defcndant-
respondents "has in fact testified that her own religious views are opposed to high-school educa-
tion." 406 U.S. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court responded that the child's wishes 
were "not an issue in the case." 406 U.S. at 231. 
Whether the child's expressed choice was an issue or not, the Court did feel the need to 
address whether the children were harmed. See note 74 infra. In rejecting Douglas' argument 
that the children's interests were distinct from those of their parents, the Court effectively chose 
to subsume the children's free exercise claim in that of their parents. This approach is especially 
striking because, while the parents' standing stemmed from their subjection to a strictly nominal 
five dollar fine, the statute violated was designed to protect the lives and minds of their children. 
In the state's view, it was the children's interests that may have been permanently harmed by 
granting an exemption. Cf Knudson, The Education of the Amish Child, 62 CALIP. L. REV. 
1506, 1516 (1974) ("The [Yoder] majority's reliance on technical standing grounds to avoid as-
sessment of the possible competing interests of parent, child, and state appears more expedient 
than persuasive."). 
74. The Court in Yoder adopted two separate approaches in holding that the state interest in 
universal education (and its associated interest in preventing exploitive child labor) was not com-
pelling. First, any harm done was de minimis, because Amish children only lost the marginal 
benefit of a year or two of high school. 406 U.S. at 222-27. This argument presumes that 16-
year-old Amish children would always choose to leave school, in accordance with religious cus-
tom. The Court considered the concern that some children would later leave the Amish commu-
nity, much disadvantaged by their incomplete education, "highly speculative." 406 U.S. at 224. 
Although the Amish defendants won in the lower court, the Supreme Court chose to character-
ize the harm done by using a hypothesis that ensures a minimally troubling outcome. The Court 
also concluded, without discussion, that Amish children are not seriously exploited by being put 
to work on the family farm. 406 U.S. at 229. 
The Court's alternative approach was to contend that the children were not harmed at all 
because the practical education Amish teenagers would receive at home could be justified "in 
terms of precisely those overall interests that the State advances in support of its program of 
compulsory high school education." 406 U.S. at 235. See text at notes 78-85 infra. 
75. As if seeking to lessen the impact of its holding, the Court emphasized that "probably 
few other religious groups or sects could make" the kind of "convincing showing" made by the 
Amish defendants. 406 U.S. at 235-36. The showing made was in fact not as extraordinary as 
the Court implied and may be conveyed simply in the terms set forth in Parts I and II.A of this 
Note. The pervasiveness of the Amish objections to high school education established that the 
objections were in fact religious rather than merely cultural or philosophical. The long history of 
the Amish religious community tends to corroborate the sincerity of the parents' beliefs. The 
showing that public high schools tend to undermine efforts to instill an Amish world view sug-
gests that the burden on religion imposed by the compulsory education requirement is a heavy 
one. There is no reason another religious group should not be able to make the same kind of 
showing. But see note 85 infra. 
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erence due religious authority when determining the interests of 
acquiescent group members. 
In two ways, the majority 9pinion seems expressly to belie any 
such implication of deference to religious authority, but, in each case, 
the appearance is deceptive. First, by emphasizing that the group 
members here are minors, the Court suggested that the authority to 
which it deferred was parental, not religious. However, the Court 
characterized the authority as "parental control over the religious up-
bringing and education of their minor children."76 Thus, it was essen-
tially the religious group's authority, exercised most immediately by 
the parents, which was at stake. 77 Furthermore, parental control was 
exercised in Yoder to terminate formal education permanently at a 
time when, as a practical matter (as well as under Wisconsin law) the 
children were not competent to take such a momentous step on their 
own. In effect, the children's opportunity to make a mature choice in 
the matter of their own education - an opportunity the state reserved 
for them by statute - was preempted by the Court's deference to reli-
gious custom. 
A second way in which the Court disguised its deference to reli-
gious authority was by justifying "[t]he Amish alternative to formal 
secondary school education"78 in secular terms. That education, the 
Court argued, equips Amish children well to be not only self-reliant 
members of a community but also good citizens in the tradition of 
Thomas Jefferson's "ideal of the 'sturdy yeoman.' "79 Neither of these 
points, however, is responsive to the state's concern that those who do 
not receive a standard education, or one "substantially equivalent to 
instruction given to children of like ages in the public or private 
schools where such children reside,"80 have been deprived of a vital 
benefit. 
In making its secular arguments, the Court essentially recast de-
fendants' free exercise arguments in secular terms, thereby assuming 
its conclusion that religious values should override the secular goal of 
producing an educated citizenry. The goal of Amish education, the 
Court observed, is "the preparation of the child for life in the sepa-
rated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish faith."81 
Not surprisingly, the Court considered the method of Amish educa-
tion an "ideal"82 way of achieving this goal. Similarly, Jefferson's 
76. 406 U.S. at 231 (emph!l.\)iS added). 
77. But see Jn re Edward C., 126 Cal. App. 3d 193, 178 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1981) (father who 
claimed his violent physical "discipline" of his children was directed by God). 
78. 406 U.S. at 225. 
79. 406 U.S. at 225. 
80. 406 U.S. at 208 n.2 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 118.15(4) (1969)). 
81. 406 U.S. at 222. 
82. 406 U.S. at 223. 
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anachronistic "sturdy yeoman," whose "basic education in the 'three 
R's' would sufficiently meet the interests of the state,"83 is hardly a 
model of the citizen who can "participate effectively and intelligently 
in our democratic process,"84 except insofar as his singular "virtues" 
and religiously motivated separateness make him a good neighbor. 
Thus, the state's interest in educating children in its chosen way was 
outweighed by the Amish interest - not because the Amish method 
of education was just as effective in achieving the state's goals, but 
because the Amish method was much more effective in achieving 
Amish goals. This bootstrapping argument suggests that what the 
Court actually intended to do was to give additional independent value 
to the interest of preserving Amish religious values. 85 
Stripped of these efforts to find secular cognates for religious val-
ues, Yoder sets out a free exercise analysis that accords sufficient defer-
ence to religious authority over group members to override what 
would otherwise be a compelling state interest. Yoder implicitly holds 
that if an individual (1) has suffered a prima facie legal harm, (2) as a 
result of religious practices, (3) is a member of the offending religious 
group, and (4) has not, in a timely manner, challenged the group's 
authority or questioned the group's characterization of the prima facie 
harm as spiritually beneficial, then the courts should discount any as-
serted state interest in intervening on behalf of that individual. 86 
It by no means follows necessarily that the state interest will al-
ways be subservient. Yoder suggests, however, that the state's interest 
in intruding upon spiritual counseling to protect a counselee who al-
leges intentional infliction of emotional distress may be much less 
compelling when the counselee is (as will typically be the case) a group 
member at the time of the allegedly tortious conduct. 
c. Defining membership. It is implicit in Yoder and other free 
exercise cases that courts should be prepared to defer somewhat to the 
self-governance of religious organizations even if it means withholding 
83. 406 U.S. at 226 n.14. 
84. 406 U.S. at 225. 
85. It is fair to ask whether Yoder indicates principally the Court's zeal to foster the free 
exercise of religion or its predilection for the quaint customs of the Amish. A recent case sought 
to raise this very issue with the Court. Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Bd. of 
Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74, 84 (Iowa), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985) (mem.) (holding that Iowa's 
statutory "Amish exception" to the compulsory school attendance law does not exempt the Cal-
vary Baptist Christian Academy from state regulation, in part because Baptist children's "educa-
tional needs are plainly not as circumscribed as those of Amish children"). But cf United States 
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying Amish exemption from participation in social security 
system). 
86. Thus characterized, it is easy to see why Justice Douglas claimed Yoder "opens the way 
to give organized religion a broader base than it has ever enjoyed; and .•• even promises that in 
time Reynolds will be overruled." 406 U.S. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (denying the Mormons an exemption from the prohibition of 
polygamy), blithely asserted Congress' right to halt any actions, regardless of their religious na-
ture, "which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." 
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from group members legal protection that would be made available to 
nonmembers. If such deference is to be accorded, membership must 
be defined in a way that provides a reasoned basis for the differential 
treatment of members and nonmembers. 
One rationale for the distinction between members and nonmem-
bers appeared over one hundred years ago in the Supreme Court case 
of Watson v. Jones: 
All who unite themselves to [voluntary religious organizations] do so 
with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to 
it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion 
of such religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by one of their decisions 
could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. 87 
Implied consent to religious governance was not initially conceived as 
a constitutional theory. 88 However, the concern with the "subver-
sion" of religious organizations derives some of its urgency from the 
constitutional stature of religious groups. 
In tort law, consent, defined as a "willingness in fact for conduct to 
occur,"89 completely cuts off a defendant's liability. Consent implied 
by words or conduct creates just as valid a defense as consent based 
upon an actual and express willingness for conduct to occur.90 It is 
fairly easy to see how consent - express or implied - can be applied 
to participation in religious rituals or ceremonies that are well known 
to group members, such as worship, confession, discipline for moral 
failings, or spiritual healing. There is express consent if the ceremony 
itself involves prior explanation and a declaration of a desire to take 
part. There is implied consent if the participants take part voluntarily 
after having learned the purpose and procedures of the ceremony. 
Foreknowledge may come through formal instruction or through hav-
ing witnessed the ceremony on previous occasions. 
A typical spiritual counseling case, however, will not follow either 
of these patterns. In order for consent to create a complete defense, it 
must appear that the plaintiff's consent was "to the particular con-
87. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872); see also Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fel-
lowship Non-Sectarian Church, 39 Cal. 2d 121, 131-32, 245 P.2d 481, 487-88 (1952) (en bane) 
cerL denied, 345 U.S. 938 (1953) (stating that those who join a church agree to submit to its 
rules); c. ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW§ 328 (1933) (same). 
88. Watson has been cited repeatedly as stating constitutional principles even though the 
Court did not view them as constitutional at the time. See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952). 
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(1) (1977). 
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) (1977) ("If words or conduct are rea-
sonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and 
are as effective as consent in fact."); see also O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., 154 Mass. 272, 28 
N.E. 266 (1891) (holding plaintiff to have consented to vaccination when she stood in line and 
presented her arm to the doctor). 
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duct, or to substantially the same conduct"91 as caused the alleged 
injury. Some counseling processes may involve highly standardized, 
or even ritualistic, procedures, so that informed participation would 
constitute consent to any possibly tortious aspects of the process.92 
Spiritual counseling, however, is more commonly an open-ended, in-
teractive process.93 While the procedures to be followed might easily 
be described in general terms beforehand, specific conduct within that 
general framework may be relatively spontaneous. Under these cir-
cumstances, consent cannot be founded upon foreknowledge of partic-
ular conduct, and no tort law defense of consent can be made out. 
The Court in Watson v. Jones, however, used the concept of "im-
plied consent" not in the strict sense employed in tort law,94 but more 
metaphorically95 to describe something like a jurisdictional conflict be-
tween the civil courts and religious authority.96 The act of taking part 
in the religious life of a particular group does not imply consent to any 
conduct that may subsequently transpire within that group. Instead, 
participation suggests that the individual is willing to submit to reli-
gious authority to the extent that the chosen group pretends to author-
ity over any given aspect of life.97 In other words, when an individual 
91. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(b) (1977). 
92. One such process, which has formed the basis of allegations of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, is the Scientologists' technique called "auditing": 
The auditor asks questions which locate "Buttons" - a conscious or subconscious indica· 
tion or response. To help locate "buttons", the auditor uses a Hubbard E-meter, a device 
which measures skin voltage. During auditing, the auditor pursues lines of questioning on 
highly personal subjects ("rundowns") to locate the subject's "buttons". The auditor then 
makes a written record of the disclosures made. 
Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1131 n.3 (D, Mass. 
1982). Anyone who had once experienced this process, or even heard it described, would appear 
to have consented to emotional injury by participating, as the process plainly relies upon a simple 
dynamic of seeking to cause emotional discomfort in the auditee. 
93. See notes 6-7 supra. 
94. Watson was not a tort case but a property dispute between rival factions of a Presbyterian 
Church. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 681. 
95. In Watson, the phrase "implied consent" was modified by the words "to this govern· 
ment." The Court's view of the religious governance to which consent was implied was, predict· 
ably, a formalistic one. The Court envisioned "tribunals for the decision of controverted 
questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individ· 
ua1 members, congregations, and officers within the general association." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 
729. As a practical matter, religious authority is not always exercised in such a formalistic man· 
ner. See note 6 supra. 
96. Watson noted that civil courts should not intervene 
where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character, - a 
matter over which the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction, - a matter which concerns theo· 
logical controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the 
members of the church to the standard of morals required of them, - becomes the subject 
of its action. 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733; cf Note, supra note 29 (discussing free exercise analysis as a conflict of 
laws problem). 
97. In this respect, members of religious groups are analogous to family members, who ar-
guably "have impliedly consented to most emotional injury by another family member." So long 
as this implied consent is not exceeded, a level of "emotional 'rough-housing' " that would be 
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has taken part long enough to understand the beliefs and practices of a 
group, continued participation gives an appearance of consent to con-
duct that is consistent with those practices or plainly dictated by those 
beliefs.98 
If the courts protect cognizant group members from the religious 
authority of their own organization, they not only undermine the con-
stitutionally protected authority of the group, but also indirectly in-
fringe the free exercise rights of those group members. A plaintiff 
cannot undo the implication of consent to defendant's religious con-
duct that exists at the time of that conduct by arguing, after the fact, 
that defendant's conduct was unjustifiable. While not as reliable as 
actual consent to particular conduct in indicating the reasonableness 
of defendant's facially tortious act, implied consent to religious gov-
ernance makes the state's interest in intervening to protect group 
members significantly less compelling than it would otherwise be. 
d. Exceptions to the member criterion. There is little precedent 
for the proposition that a free exercise defense to allegations of tor-
tious conduct should be effective if, at the time of the conduct, the 
plaintiff was a member of the group whose beliefs and practices the 
defendant is raising as a defense.99 However, when courts have held 
the defense unavailing even though plaintiff and defendant were mem-
intolerable from strangers is routinely tolerated. Cole, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress Among Family Members, 61 DEN. L.J. 553, 569 (1984). Tolerating such injury is in keeping 
with the view that "in the interest not only of freedom of speech but also of avoidance of other 
more dangerous conduct, it is still very desirable that some safety valve be left through which 
irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 
19, § 12 at 59. 
The limitations of this analogy to the family are suggested by the House of Judah case, which 
involved a self-proclaimed prophet who was deemed to be the "guardian" of his religious com-
munity's 66 children for the purposes of a juvenile court hearing into the severe disciplinary 
practices of the group. Those practices led to the death of one child. See Note, House of Judah: 
The Problem of Child Abuse and Neglect in Communes and Cults, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1089 
(1985). 
98. Cf. O'Moore v. Driscoll, 135 Cal. App. 770, 776, 28 P.2d 438, 441 (1933) (Excessive 
church discipline "had no tendency to spread the gospel" and was thus beyond the scope of 
church authority.). Before consent to spiritual counseling may be implied, a counselee should 
not only be aware of the theological premises of the counseling but should also be able to perceive 
that a particular application of them is being made. Cf. Shulman v. Lerner, 2 Mich. App. 705, 
708, 141N.W.2d348, 349 (1966) (no consent to operation, even though patient, a dentist, could 
be presumed to understand the import of preparatory procedures, because patient expected non-
surgical treatment and "could not see or feel the surgery as it progressed."). 
99. Two recent trial court actions dismissing cases involving internal religious disputes are 
suggestive. In one case, an infant died when Christian Scientist practitioners hired by his parents 
failed to heal him. Though the father chose "alternative health care" rather than a medical 
doctor (who, concededly, would probably have effected a cure), he sought to have the standard of 
care applicable to the doctor applied to the practitioners. The father explained, "We were not 
going to church because we were loyal Christian Scientists . . . • We were going for the healing of 
our son." Detroit News, Sept. 8, 1983, at Al, A6, col. 1. Although there was undeniable and 
serious harm to an individual, the case was dismissed on the strength of the church's free exercise 
defense. Id. 
In the Nally case, discussed in notes 1-2 supra, the counselee was a member; the case was 
dismissed twice on first amendment grounds. See Judge Dismisses Clergy Malpractice Suit on 
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bers of the same group, one or the other of two circumstances has 
generally existed: either the plaintiff was not competent to give full, 
reasoned assent to the group's beliefs and practices or malice was im-
puted to the defendant. 
Youth or mental instability may render a plaintiff incompetent to 
assent to religious practices, 100 but so may a defendant's coercive or 
deceptive recruitment tactics. 101 To the extent that a membership cri-
terion relies upon a theory of implied consent to religious governance, 
it should be clear why practices that overreach proselytes and negate 
their freedom to adopt or reject religious beliefs would forfeit any 
Coast, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1985, at 11, col. 1 (city ed.); see also Clergy Malpractice Suits Pose 
Disturbing Questions, San Fran. Examiner & Chron., May 19, 1985, at AS, col. 1. 
100. Incompetence is a fairly clearcut issue when, for example, children, who are not capable 
oflegal consent, act against their own interest. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 19, at§ 18; 
cf Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("Parents may be free to become martyrs 
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of 
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make 
that choice themselves."); In re Edward C., 126 Cal. App. 3d 193, 200, 178 Cal. Rptr. 694, 698 
(1981) (court removed children from their abusive father who "proclaimed that he loved and 
treated his children equally and that God directed his discipline of them. Counseling would be 
useless since he had given his heart to the Lord."). But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972) (allowing prima facie harm to children on theory that parents are entitled to direct the 
education of their minor children). Yoder, in which the parents consented on their children's 
behalf to a statutory harm they deemed beneficial, must be distinguished from the case fo which 
no parental consent was given. If, for example, a 13-year-old runs away from home and joins a 
religious commune, one might argue that legal consent to the commune's religious practices is 
impossible. 
101. The issue of a plaintiff's competence to assent to religious practices is especially trouble-
some if the defendant's religious group is the sort of "new religion" or "cult" whose means of 
gaining and retaining members appear overzealous by comparison to most well-established 
groups. See, e.g., Lewis v. Holy Spirit Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity, 589 F. 
Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1983) (alleging brainwashing); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Assn., 125 Misc. 2d 
1061, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (same); see also Delgado, Cults and Conversion: The Case 
for Informed Consent, 16 GA. L. REV. 533, 544 (1982) ("[U]ntil recently, religious groups re-
cruited relatively openly and honestly."). There is a serious concern that the tactics of "decep-
tion to gain a foothold and coercive persuasion to consolidate it" may result in a gradual 
destruction of individual autonomy- the capacity to consent. Id. at 545; see also Aronin, Cults, 
Deprogramming, and Guardianship: A Model Legislative Proposal, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. 
PROBS. 163 (1982) (proposing model legislation for guardianship of cult members during 
deprogramming); Shapiro, Of Robots, Persons, and the Protection of Religious Belieft, 56 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 1277, 1281 (1983) ("The more serious and exceptional implication of [brainwashing] 
claims is that a person has become a robot - that as a result of coercive influences, he has lost 
the attributes of an autonomous being."). But see Meroni, 125 Misc. 2d at 1066 ("Despite the 
possibility of coercive persuasion or 'brainwashing' the right of the individual to make such a 
choice is so important that it cannot be removed absent the showing of a grave disability.") 
(quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity, No. 769-529 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct., Oct. 20, 1983), ajfd. in part, revd. in part on other grounds, 179 Cal. App. 3d 450 (1986); 
Shapiro, supra, at 1281 ("[O]nly if [coercive] influences are applied without consent and, as a 
result, an individual lacks the capacity to adopt or affirm religious beliefs, may the state intervene 
to restore such capacity.") (emphasis in original). 
Ironically, those who seek to combat the effects of this sort of "persuasion" often resort to 
physically and emotionally tortious means: "Defacing the image of someone's revered lender or 
deity, together with profane name-calling, would likely be considered extreme and outrageous. 
The intent of the actor is to create emotional distress, since deprogrammers hope this distress will 
jar the subject into a critical analysis of his experience." Case Comment, Tort Liability for Cult 
Deprogramming: Peterson v. Sorlien, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 465, 481 (1982). 
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group's claim to assert religious authority over group members. For 
the purposes of free exercise analysis, a court should equate plaintiffs 
who joined groups after succumbing to "coercive persuasion" with 
plaintiffs who never joined at all. 
Similarly, malicious conduct by a spiritual counselor or religious 
group will typically vitiate any express or implied consent by group 
members to cooperate with or abide by actions or decisions taken pur-
suant to religious authority. 102 One typically joins a religious group in 
the hope of enhancing one's own welfare. Granted, conceptions of 
spiritual benefits vary widely; an individual may certainly choose to 
become a scapegoat or martyr for religious reasons. It is also true that 
many people adhere to religious institutions for social, cultural, or eco-
nomic reasons and may be indifferent to whether they derive spiritual 
benefits from their religious activities. However, it would surely be 
wrong to infer that any individual, by joining a religious group, con-
sents to be used maliciously by that group as a means to the ends of 
the group or of some authority figure within it. 
Accordingly, the courts have been inclined to deny a free exercise 
defense when the conduct that would be protected was not merely in-
tended to cause arguably harmful effects (such as emotional distress), 
but was in fact motivated by hostility or ill will against a member (or 
ex-member) of the group. 103 Thus, while malice or overreaching in 
102. See Ericsson, supra note 1, at 182 (suggesting that an "actual malice" standard be ap-
plied in spiritual counselor cases). Malice, or "ill will," is to be distinguished from simple intent. 
See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 19, § 8 at 36 ("The intent with which tort liability is 
concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to 
bring about a result which will invade the interest of another in a way the law forbids."). 
103. In Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 
1982), the plaintiff claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the Church's 
counseling technique, "auditing." See note 92supra. The court dismissed this part of the case for 
failure to state a claim, despite some indications that the technique had been used as a weapon 
against the plaintiff. (For example, the defendants disclosed confidential information obtained 
during these sessions to third parties.) The court did allow intentional infliction of emotional 
distress charges against the Church based on a "Church policy" called the "Fair Game Doc-
trine" (allegedly "repealed" later by the Church) that permitted harassment of ex-members and 
other "suppressive persons." The plaintiff's complaint alleged "a course of conduct, including 
slanderous telephone calls ... , physical threats, and assault with an automobile, which was 
desigued to dissuade her from pursuing her legal rights." 535 F. Supp. at 1131, 1142. 
Van Schaick is in accord with Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 
105 (1975). In Bear, the court disallowed a demurrer based on the first amendment to a com-
plaint alleging interference with business relations and alienation of affections. The Church had 
excommunicated the plaintiff and then taken the further step of instructing members of the 
Church to "shun" him. The court tentatively ruled that "the courts of this Commonwealth may 
have the authority to regulate" such practices, despite the first amendment defense, because of 
the "paramount state concern" with the areas invaded by the Church's conduct. 462 Pa. at 334-
35, 341 A.2d at 107 (emphasis in original). It is surely also relevant that "shunning" is a means 
of helping the Church at the expense of ex-members, who may plausibly argue that they are in no 
way helped or reformed by the process. 
Also in accord are two Ohio cases upholding the inverse proposition - the clergy's right to 
give well-intentioned spiritual counsel to those who request it, even if that counsel may affect the 
longevity of the counselee's marriage. Radecki v. Schuckardt, 50 Ohio App. 2d 92, 94, 361 
N.E.2d 543, 544 (1976) (dissenting Catholic bishop counseled that "if necessary, a person should 
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the form of proselytization abuses makes the state's interest in protect-
ing individual counselees compelling, legal wrong done to a compe-
tent, cognizant group member in a sincere effort, undertaken pursuant 
to religious doctrine, to benefit the counselee does not present an espe-
cially compelling opportunity for state intervention, through tort rem-
edies or otherwise. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE 
The foregoing review and assessment of authorities leaves only one 
narrow class of cases in which a spiritual counselor's free exercise de-
fense to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress merits 
serious consideration: 
(1) The particular conduct alleged to have caused plaintiff's dis-
tress must have been dictated by a sincere religious belief and carried 
out in accordance with the established beliefs and practices of the 
counselor's religious group; 
(2) The plaintiff must have been a member of the counselor's reli-
gious group at the time of the alleged tort. That is, it must be reason-
able to infer plaintiff's knowledge of and assent to the beliefs and 
practices of that group. This inference is not reasonable if plaintiff was 
rendered incompetent to adopt or affirm religious beliefs by coercive or 
deceptive practices of the group or if plaintiff was incompetent to 
adopt or affirm religious beliefs at the time of the alleged tort because 
of youth or another disability; and 
(3) The allegedly tortious conduct must not have been malicious. 
That is, the conduct must not have been motivated by hostility toward 
the plaintiff or by a desire to benefit the group or a member of it at the 
plaintiff's expense. In positive terms, the conduct must have been mo-
tivated principally or entirely by a desire to benefit the counselee, spiri-
tually or otherwise. 
As all three of these criteria require the resolution of potentially 
difficult factual questions, it will virtually never be appropriate for a 
court to dismiss an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
against a spiritual counselor as a matter of law on the strength of an 
asserted free exercise defense. Despite the presence of these sticky is-
sues, however, and perhaps due to an understandable zeal to remain 
leave a spouse who interferes with [her] practice of religion."); Bradesku v. Antion, 21 Ohio App. 
2d 67, 255 N.E.2d 265 (1969) (woman divorced her husband after being counseled that her 
marriage to a divorced man was adulterous); cf. Carrieri v. Bush, 69 Wash. 2d 536, 545, 419 P.2d 
132, 137 (1966) ("[O]ne does not, under the guise of exercising religious beliefs, acquire a license 
to wrongfully interfere with familial relations. Good faith and reasonable conduct are the neces-
sary touchstones to any qualified privilege that may arise from any invited and religiously di-
rected family counseling ..•• "). 
The comments of defendant church elder Allen Cash in the Oklahoma case discussed at note 
34 supra are again illustrative: "Whether we pay or don't pay, we will be concerned about Mar· 
ian until her life is made right with the Lord. . . • Everything we did was out oflove and concern 
for Marian." N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1984, at A15, col. 1 (city ed.). 
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"neutral" in all religious disputes, 104 courts have tended to view a 
proffered free exercise defense as a claim of immunity from suit. 105 
Not surprisingly, these courts have taken a dim view of such claims, 
acceptance of which would amount to a reinstatement (for religious 
organizations) of the charitable immunity doctrine no longer in favor 
with the courts.106 
The simplest logical response to the rejection of religious immunity 
from liability for intentional torts is to affirm the negative of the re-
jected proposition. Thus, in denying the immunity claim, the court 
presumes that the free exercise clause has nothing to do with the 
case. 107 It is then but a short step to declaring that, as a matter of 
constitutional law, there is no circumstance in which the state's inter-
est in protecting individuals from the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress permits a first amendment defense to be effective.108 
While such an approach may be more likely to lead to correct results 
in individual cases than a broad immunity rule, it merely circumvents 
constitutional analysis, which demands an ordered inquiry into the in-
terests at stake in light of the legal damages claimed. 
One way to systematize such a constitutional inquiry would be to 
adopt a spiritual counselor privilege, 109 mandating that facially tor-
tious conduct is protected when the criteria described at the beginning 
of this part are met. 110 The privilege could be adopted by the courts as 
104. See note 32 supra. 
105. See, e.g., Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.R.!. 1978), ajfd. per 
curiam, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979) (free exercise clause does not immunize defendants); Nally 
v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984), (deleted from official 
reporter by California Supreme Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984)) ("[T]he free exercise 
clause ... does not license intentional infliction of emotional distress in the name of religion 
•... "); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity, 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 
1067, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710 (Sup. Ct. 1984) ("That one performs a tort or commits a crime in 
the furtherance of a 'religious' activity . . . does not confer immunity upon such alleged 
wrongdoer."). 
106. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 45A Introductory Note ("[T]he modem ten-
dency has been to view immunities with a considerable degree of disapproval ... . ");see note 19 
supra. 
107. This appears to be the approach taken in all of the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress cases cited in notes 2 and 15 supra. 
108. See note 105 supra. 
109. Possession of a privilege means "that conduct which, under ordinary circumstances, 
would subject the actor to liability, under particular circumstances does not subject him to such 
liability." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 10(1) (1977). Tort privileges may arise in order 
to protect an overriding interest, in which case the privilege is derived from "the value attached 
to the interest to be protected or advanced by [its] exercise." Id. at§ 10(2) comment d. A free 
exercise privilege is thus a narrowly tailored exemption from an admittedly constitutional law. 
E.g .. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (exemption 
from rule that employees who quit may not receive unemployment compensation). 
An immunity is both broader than a privilege and more dependent upon the actor's status 
than upon the circumstances of the act. In a spiritual counseling case, existence of privilege 
would not depend as much upon the religious status of the counselor as upon the religiously 
motivated nature of the conduct. 
110. See conditions listed at beginning of Part III supra. 
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a matter of constitutional law or by legislatures in order to clarify the 
law prospectively.111 
At least two advantages would flow from adopting such a privi-
lege. First, in determining the applicability of the free exercise clause, 
courts could attend systematically to the most pertinent aspects of a 
case, thereby avoiding arbitrary balancing acts or conclusory rules of 
thumb. Second, the more clearly and publicly a rule protecting spiri-
tual counseling is announced, the less likely there is to be any burden 
on free exercise in the form of a "chilling" of the process of counseling 
due to fear of civil liability. A rule that promised to protect genuinely 
religious and properly motivated counseling of competent and cogni-
zant adults would serve constitutional goals by removing the burden 
that diffidence and prudence would otherwise impose on spiritual 
counseling. At the same time, it would put the less well intentioned on 
notice that the free exercise clause will not be construed to protect 
secular activities, overreaching, or malice. 
Despite these advantages, this Note stops short of advocating the 
prospective adoption of a spiritual counselor privilege, for suclifili ap-
proach is not justified by existing authorities. The most those authori-
ties suggest is that cases may yet arise in which courts will be 
constitutionally compelled to recognize a free exercise defense to in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress (or to other intentional torts). 
The Supreme Court has never approached the issue, and those cases 
that have arisen in lower courts have not presented facts upon which a 
privilege could properly have been granted. 112 
111. The following is an illustrative legislative proposal: 
§ 1. "Spiritual counselor" means an individual who is endowed by a religious group with the 
authority to give personal counsel derived from that group's religious tenets. 
§ 2. A spiritual counselor is not liable to his or her counselee for the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress if 
(a) the counselee is a member of the counselor's religious group at the time of the alleged 
tort; 
(b) the allegedly tortious conduct is 
(I) dictated by the counselor's religious faith, 
(2) committed in the course of spiritual counseling, and 
(3) motivated by a desire to further the counselee's welfare; and 
(c) the counselee 
(1) does not express lack of consent to the counselor's conduct before or at the time 
of the alleged tort, 
(2) is competent to consent at the time of the alleged tort, and 
(3) has not been rendered incompetent to adopt or affirm religious beliefs by coercive 
or deceptive practices of the counselor's religious group. 
112. Of the intentional infliction of emotional distress cases cited in notes 2 and 15 supra, in 
one, defendants denied that their religion dictated facially tortious conduct, Nally v. Grace Com-
munity Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 308 (1984), (deleted from official reporter by 
California Supreme Court, see 151 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984)); in three, plaintiffs failed to state a 
claim, Lewis v. Holy Spirit Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity, 589 F. Supp. 10 (D. 
Mass. 1983); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978), ajfd. per curiam, 602 
F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); Christolferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 57 Or. App. 203, 
644 P.2d 577 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); in another, the conduct 
alleged was clearly malicious and was directed at an ex-member, Van Schaick v. Church of 
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The most appropriate posture at this time is one of receptivity to 
the free exercise defense combined with a close scrutiny of the basis 
upon which the defense is asserted. If future cases are like past ones, 
the defense will rarely stand up under close scrutiny. However, the 
ease with which emotional distress may be alleged and the serious bur-
den upon religious freedom that would be posed by a rash of successful 
suits against spiritual counselors require that recourse to the free exer-
cise clause by religious defendants not be too lightly swept aside. 
CONCLUSION 
When allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
arise from spiritual counseling, precipitate rejection of a spiritual 
counselor's free exercise defense would defy the Constitution's valua-
tion of religious freedom. The state has a significant interest in provid-
ing a remedy to intentional tort victims, but providing that remedy is 
likely to disrupt and distort the spiritual counseling process. In the 
abstract, both competing interests are compelling; yet neither a flat 
rejection of free exercise rights nor an immunity for religious 
tortfeasors is appropriate. As a practical matter, a careful factual 
analysis of individual cases can probably prevent the serious compro-
mise of either set of values. 
While a case such as that set forth in the Introduction to this Note 
might properly support a free exercise defense, such facts are liable to 
be the exception. If the particular conduct alleged to have caused 
plaintiff's distress was not dictated by religious belief or practice, then 
the conduct was not the free exercise of religion, and the defense is 
unavailable. If the plaintiff was not a member of defendant's religious 
group at the time of the allegedly tortious act, the inherent constraints 
of the free exercise clause itself prevent its use as a defense. The same 
principle holds if plaintiff was a group member, but was incompetent 
to assent to religious beliefs, whether because of youth, emotional in-
stability, abusive recruitment practices, or other disabilities. Finally, 
malice nullifies a free exercise defense at little cost to the social and 
constitutional values served by spiritual counseling. 
- Lee W. Brooks 
Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982); and in the last, the group was 
alleged to have overreached an emotionally disturbed man, Meroni v. Holy Spirit Assn. for the 
Unification of World Christianity, 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
